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In the last decade, syndromic surveillance has increas-
ingly been used worldwide for detecting increases or 
outbreaks of infectious diseases that might be missed 
by surveillance based on laboratory diagnoses and 
notifications by clinicians alone. There is, however, 
an ongoing debate about the feasibility of syndromic 
surveillance and its potential added value. Here we 
present our perspective on syndromic surveillance, 
based on the results of a retrospective analysis of 
syndromic data from six Dutch healthcare registries, 
covering 1999–2009 or part of this period. These 
registries had been designed for other purposes, 
but were evaluated for their potential use in signal-
ling infectious disease dynamics and outbreaks. Our 
results show that syndromic surveillance clearly has 
added value in revealing the blind spots of traditional 
surveillance, in particular by detecting unusual, local 
outbreaks independently of diagnoses of specific 
pathogens, and by monitoring disease burden and vir-
ulence shifts of common pathogens. Therefore we rec-
ommend the use of syndromic surveillance for these 
applications.
Background 
In the last decade, syndromic surveillance has increas-
ingly been implemented to detect and monitor infec-
tious disease outbreaks, as early detection and control 
may well mitigate the impact of epidemics [1-3]. In the 
United Kingdom, for example, a telephone health hel-
pline (NHS Direct) is used for syndromic surveillance 
[1]; in France, a syndromic surveillance system based 
on hospital emergency data has been deployed [4]; 
and in North America several syndromic surveillance 
systems exist using data such as telephone helpline 
calls [5] and hospital emergency department visits 
[2,6]. Traditional outbreak detection based on astute 
clinicians and laboratory diagnoses can have blind 
spots for emerging diseases, because patients report-
ing with common symptoms (e.g. pneumonia) associ-
ated with the disease may not alarm clinicians, and 
uncommon or new pathogens can remain undetected 
by laboratories (such as initially happened in the out-
break of severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) in 
2003). Syndromic surveillance may reveal such blind 
spots of traditional surveillance by monitoring eleva-
tions of common symptoms or clinical diagnoses such 
as shortness of breath or pneumonia. 
The increasing use of syndromic surveillance seems 
driven by two factors: (i) high-profile disease events 
(e.g. the 2001 anthrax attacks, 2003 SARS outbreak, 
the threat of a new influenza pandemic, excess mortal-
ity due to heat waves) stressing the need for improved 
early warning surveillance; and (ii) the increased avail-
ability of electronic healthcare data, making large-
scale monitoring of non-specific health indicators 
increasingly feasible. 
There is, however, an ongoing debate about the added 
value of syndromic surveillance. Some scepticism 
exists about the potential workload it may generate if 
used for real-time outbreak detection (i.e. if the sys-
tem creates many false-positive signals) [7]. In the 
Netherlands, this debate has led to a research project 
to evaluate the potential value of syndromic surveil-
lance for infectious disease surveillance and control, 
and to make recommendations for its implementation. 
The questions addressed were: (i) what syndromic data 
types track known dynamics of infectious diseases in 
the general population, and thus will also be likely to 
reflect emerging pathogen activity? (ii) can syndromic 
surveillance improve the monitoring of disease burden 
and/or detect shifts in the virulence of common patho-
gens? (iii) can syndromic surveillance detect local out-
breaks that have a limited number of signals in time, 
independent of laboratory detection of the causative 
pathogens?
We addressed these questions by retrospectively ana-
lysing syndromic data from six Dutch healthcare regis-
tries, and also by ad hoc use of syndromic surveillance 
for upcoming infectious disease problems. To select 
2 www.eurosurveillance.org
Ta
bl
e 
1
Sy
nd
ro
m
ic
 d
at
a 
re
gi
st
rie
s i
nc
lu
de
d 
in
 th
e 
sy
nd
ro
m
ic
 su
rv
ei
lla
nc
e 
ev
al
ua
tio
n 
st
ud
y, 
th
e 
N
et
he
rla
nd
s
Da
ta
 ty
pe
Re
gi
st
ry
Pe
rio
d 
ev
al
ua
te
d
Po
pu
la
tio
n 
co
ve
ra
ge
(%
)a
Sy
nd
ro
m
e 
in
fo
rm
at
io
nb
 
Da
ta
 a
na
ly
se
d
In
te
rn
at
io
na
l c
od
in
g 
sy
st
em
 P
ro
sp
ec
tiv
e 
im
pl
em
en
ta
tio
n 
of
 
su
rv
ei
lla
nc
e
Ab
se
nt
ee
is
m
 
Na
tio
na
l a
bs
en
te
ei
sm
 re
gi
st
ry
 
by
 S
ta
tis
tic
s 
Ne
th
er
la
nd
s 
(C
BS
)[8
]
20
02
–0
3
80
 (o
f t
he
 w
or
ki
ng
 
po
pu
la
tio
n 
of
 
8 
m
ill
io
n)
Em
pl
oy
ee
s 
re
po
rte
d 
si
ck
, 
no
 fu
rth
er
 m
ed
ic
al
 in
fo
rm
at
io
n
Si
ck
 le
av
e 
re
po
rts
 b
y 
em
pl
oy
er
s
–
NA
c
Ge
ne
ra
l 
pr
ac
tit
io
ne
r 
co
ns
ul
ta
tio
ns
Ne
th
er
la
nd
s 
In
fo
rm
at
io
n 
Ne
tw
or
k 
of
 G
en
er
al
 P
ra
ct
ic
e 
(L
IN
H,
 b
y 
NI
VE
L-
th
e 
Ne
th
er
la
nd
s 
In
st
itu
te
 fo
r 
He
al
th
 S
er
vi
ce
s 
Re
se
ar
ch
) [
9]
20
01
–0
4
1–
2d
Sy
m
pt
om
s 
an
d 
di
ag
no
se
s 
in
di
ca
tin
g 
in
fe
ct
io
us
 d
is
ea
se
Sy
m
pt
om
s 
an
d 
di
ag
no
se
s 
re
co
rd
ed
 in
 g
en
er
al
 p
ra
ct
ic
e 
or
 
te
le
ph
on
e 
co
ns
ul
ta
tio
ns
, 
an
d 
ho
m
e 
vi
si
ts
In
te
rn
at
io
na
l C
la
ss
ifi
ca
tio
n 
of
 P
rim
ar
y 
Ca
re
 (I
CP
C)
Re
al
-ti
m
e 
sy
st
em
 
cu
rre
nt
ly
 b
ei
ng
 
im
pl
em
en
te
d
Ph
ar
m
ac
y 
pr
es
cr
ip
tio
ns
 
Fo
un
da
tio
n 
fo
r P
ha
rm
ac
eu
tic
al
 
St
at
is
tic
s 
(S
FK
) [
10
]
20
01
–0
3
85
Pr
es
cr
ib
ed
 m
ed
ic
at
io
ns
 
in
di
ca
tin
g 
in
fe
ct
io
us
 d
is
ea
se
Pr
es
cr
ip
tio
n 
m
ed
ic
at
io
ns
 
di
sp
en
se
d 
in
 D
ut
ch
 
ph
ar
m
ac
ie
s
An
at
om
ic
al
 T
he
ra
pe
ut
ic
 
Ch
em
ic
al
 C
la
ss
ifi
ca
tio
n 
Sy
st
em
 (A
TC
)
Cu
rre
nt
ly
 m
on
th
ly
 
da
ta
 u
pd
at
es
 a
re
 
fe
as
ib
le
 in
 
ad
 h
oc
 p
ub
lic
 h
ea
lth
 
si
tu
at
io
ns
Ho
sp
ita
lis
at
io
ns
Du
tc
h 
Na
tio
na
l M
ed
ic
al
 
Re
gi
st
er
 (L
M
R)
 b
y 
Du
tc
h 
Ho
sp
ita
l D
at
a 
(D
HD
) [
11
]
19
99
–2
00
7
99
Ge
ne
ra
l  
sy
m
pt
om
s 
an
d 
di
ag
no
se
s 
an
d 
sp
ec
ifi
c 
bi
ol
og
ic
al
 a
ge
nt
 d
ia
gn
os
es
Di
sc
ha
rg
e 
an
d 
se
co
nd
ar
y 
di
ag
no
se
s 
an
d 
da
te
 o
f 
ho
sp
ita
lis
at
io
n
In
te
rn
at
io
na
l 
Cl
as
si
fic
at
io
n 
of
 D
is
ea
se
s,
 
Ni
nt
h,
Re
vi
si
on
 C
lin
ic
al
 
M
od
ifi
ca
tio
n 
(IC
D-
9-
CM
)
No
 p
ro
sp
ec
tiv
e 
im
pl
em
en
ta
tio
n 
po
ss
ib
le
 in
 th
e 
sh
or
t t
er
m
 (a
nn
ua
l 
da
ta
 u
pd
at
es
 w
ill
 
co
nt
in
ue
)
La
bo
ra
to
ry
 
su
bm
is
si
on
s 
(n
eg
at
iv
e 
an
d 
po
si
tiv
e 
re
su
lts
)
Na
tio
na
l I
nf
ec
tio
us
 D
is
ea
se
s 
In
fo
rm
at
io
n 
Sy
st
em
 (I
SI
S-
M
M
L)
 
[1
2]
20
01
–0
4
16
Su
bm
is
si
on
s 
fo
r s
pe
ci
fic
 
m
ic
ro
bi
ol
og
ic
al
 d
ia
gn
os
tic
 
te
st
s 
La
bo
ra
to
ry
 s
ub
m
is
si
on
 
re
qu
es
ts
 fo
r d
ia
gn
os
tic
 te
st
in
g
–
NA
c
M
or
ta
lit
y 
Ca
us
e 
of
 d
ea
th
 a
nd
 c
ru
de
 
m
or
ta
lit
y 
re
gi
st
ry
 b
y S
ta
tis
tic
s 
Ne
th
er
la
nd
s 
(C
BS
)[1
3]
19
99
–2
00
4 
fo
r 
ca
us
e-
of
-d
ea
th
 
da
ta
;
19
99
–2
00
9 
fo
r 
cr
ud
e 
m
or
ta
lit
y 
da
ta
10
0
Ge
ne
ra
l s
ym
pt
om
s 
an
d/
or
 
di
ag
no
se
s 
an
d 
bi
ol
og
ic
al
 
ag
en
t-s
pe
ci
fic
  d
ia
gn
os
es
Da
te
 o
f d
ea
th
, p
rim
ar
y 
ca
us
e 
of
 d
ea
th
, c
om
pl
ic
at
in
g 
an
d 
ot
he
r a
dd
iti
on
al
 c
au
se
s 
of
 
de
at
h
In
te
rn
at
io
na
l C
la
ss
ifi
ca
tio
n 
of
 D
is
ea
se
s,
 10
th
 re
vi
si
on
 
(IC
D-
10
)
Cu
rre
nt
ly
 w
ee
kl
y 
cr
ud
e 
m
or
ta
lit
y 
su
rv
ei
lla
nc
e 
(p
ilo
t p
ha
se
)
N
A:
 n
ot
 a
pp
lic
ab
le
.
a  C
al
cu
la
te
d 
as
 a
 p
er
ce
nt
ag
e 
of
 th
e 
to
ta
l p
op
ul
at
io
n 
(1
6.
3 
m
ill
io
n 
in
 2
00
6 
[1
4]
), 
un
le
ss
 o
th
er
w
is
e 
in
di
ca
te
d.
 
b  D
et
ai
le
d 
sy
nd
ro
m
e 
de
fin
iti
on
s 
av
ai
la
bl
e 
fr
om
 th
e 
au
th
or
s 
on
 re
qu
es
t.
c  T
he
 la
bo
ra
to
ry
 s
ub
m
is
si
on
s 
re
gi
st
ry
 (I
SI
S-
M
M
L)
 a
nd
 th
e 
na
tio
na
l a
bs
en
te
ei
sm
 re
gi
st
ry
 c
ea
se
d 
to
 e
xi
st
 d
ur
in
g 
ou
r s
tu
dy
.
d  T
he
 G
P 
re
gi
st
ry
 c
ov
er
ag
e 
w
ill
 in
cr
ea
se
 to
 5
%
 in
 th
e 
ne
xt
 fe
w
 y
ea
rs
 a
s 
pa
rt
 o
f t
he
 S
ur
ve
ill
an
ce
 N
et
w
or
k 
Ne
th
er
la
nd
s 
(S
UN
N)
, w
hi
ch
 is
  p
re
do
m
in
an
tly
 fo
cu
se
d 
on
 in
flu
en
za
 s
ur
ve
ill
an
ce
 [1
5]
.  
3www.eurosurveillance.org
Ta
bl
e 
2
Tr
ac
ki
ng
 o
f i
nf
ec
tio
us
 d
ise
as
e 
dy
na
m
ic
s u
sin
g 
th
re
e 
sy
nd
ro
m
es
 a
nd
 si
x 
da
ta
 ty
pe
s f
ro
m
 h
ea
lth
ca
re
 re
gi
st
rie
s, 
sy
nd
ro
m
ic
 su
rv
ei
lla
nc
e 
ev
al
ua
tio
n 
st
ud
y, 
th
e 
N
et
he
rla
nd
s
Da
ta
 ty
pe
s
Re
sp
ira
to
ry
 s
yn
dr
om
es
Ga
st
ro
en
te
rit
is
 s
yn
dr
om
es
Ne
ur
ol
og
ic
al
 s
yn
dr
om
es
Ab
se
nt
ee
is
m
W
in
te
r p
ea
ks
 c
on
cu
rre
nt
 w
ith
 p
ea
ks
 in
 in
flu
en
za
 v
iru
s,
 R
SV
 
an
d 
ot
he
r r
es
pi
ra
to
ry
 p
at
ho
ge
ns
; 6
8%
 o
f v
ar
ia
tio
ns
 e
xp
la
in
ed
 
by
 re
sp
ira
to
ry
 p
at
ho
ge
ns
; 2
 w
ee
ks
 a
he
ad
 o
f R
SV
, 4
–5
 w
ee
ks
 
ah
ea
d 
of
 in
flu
en
za
 [1
9]
No
t e
va
lu
at
ed
a
No
t e
va
lu
at
ed
a
Ge
ne
ra
l 
pr
ac
tit
io
ne
r 
co
ns
ul
ta
tio
ns
W
in
te
r p
ea
ks
 c
on
cu
rre
nt
 w
ith
 p
ea
ks
 in
 in
flu
en
za
, R
SV
 a
nd
 
ot
he
r r
es
pi
ra
to
ry
 p
at
ho
ge
ns
: 8
6%
 o
f v
ar
ia
tio
ns
 e
xp
la
in
ed
 b
y 
re
sp
ira
to
ry
 p
at
ho
ge
ns
, 1
 w
ee
k 
be
hi
nd
 R
SV
, 1
–2
 w
ee
ks
 a
he
ad
 
of
 in
flu
en
za
 [1
9]
W
in
te
r p
ea
ks
 a
nd
 s
um
m
er
 p
ea
ks
 c
on
cu
rre
nt
 w
ith
 ro
ta
vi
ru
s 
an
d 
Sh
ig
el
la
/S
al
m
on
el
la
/C
am
py
lo
ba
ct
er
 p
ea
ks
, r
es
pe
ct
iv
el
y:
 2
9%
 
of
 v
ar
ia
tio
ns
 e
xp
la
in
ed
 b
y 
ga
st
ro
en
te
ra
l p
at
ho
ge
ns
 (5
1%
 fo
r 
th
os
e 
ag
ed
 0
–4
 y
ea
rs
, t
w
o 
w
ee
ks
 a
he
ad
 o
f r
ot
av
iru
s)
 [2
0]
; 
an
 in
cr
ea
se
 in
 w
in
te
r o
f 2
00
2/
03
 p
os
si
bl
y 
re
la
te
d 
to
 
no
ro
vi
ru
s 
ac
tiv
ity
 [2
1]
No
 c
le
ar
 re
fle
ct
io
n 
of
 k
no
w
n 
di
se
as
e 
dy
na
m
ic
s
Ph
ar
m
ac
y 
pr
es
cr
ip
tio
ns
W
in
te
r p
ea
ks
 c
on
cu
rre
nt
 w
ith
 p
ea
ks
 in
 in
flu
en
za
, R
SV
 a
nd
 
ot
he
r r
es
pi
ra
to
ry
 p
at
ho
ge
ns
: 8
0%
 o
f v
ar
ia
tio
ns
 e
xp
la
in
ed
 b
y 
re
sp
ira
to
ry
 p
at
ho
ge
ns
; 1
 w
ee
k 
be
hi
nd
 R
SV
, 0
–2
 w
ee
ks
 a
he
ad
 
of
 in
flu
en
za
 [1
9]
Re
la
tiv
el
y 
lo
w
 w
in
te
r p
ea
ks
 a
nd
 h
ig
he
r s
um
m
er
 p
ea
ks
 
co
nc
ur
re
nt
 w
ith
 ro
ta
vi
ru
s 
an
d 
 
Sh
ig
el
la
/S
al
m
on
el
la
/C
am
py
lo
ba
ct
er
 p
ea
ks
, r
es
pe
ct
iv
el
y
No
t e
va
lu
at
ed
b
Ho
sp
ita
lis
at
io
ns
W
in
te
r p
ea
ks
 c
on
cu
rre
nt
 w
ith
 p
ea
ks
 in
 in
flu
en
za
, R
SV
 a
nd
 
ot
he
r r
es
pi
ra
to
ry
 p
at
ho
ge
ns
; 8
4%
 o
f v
ar
ia
tio
ns
 e
xp
la
in
ed
 b
y 
re
sp
ira
to
ry
 p
at
ho
ge
ns
; i
n 
co
nc
ur
re
nc
e 
w
ith
 R
SV
, 1
–2
 w
ee
ks
 
ah
ea
d 
of
 in
flu
en
za
 [1
9]
Re
la
tiv
el
y 
hi
gh
 w
in
te
r p
ea
ks
 a
nd
 lo
w
er
 s
um
m
er
 p
ea
ks
 
co
nc
ur
re
nt
 w
ith
 ro
ta
vi
ru
s 
an
d 
Sh
ig
el
la
/S
al
m
on
el
la
/
Ca
m
py
lo
ba
ct
er
 p
ea
ks
, r
es
pe
ct
iv
el
y:
 4
0%
 o
f v
ar
ia
tio
ns
 e
xp
la
in
ed
 
by
 g
as
tro
en
te
ra
l p
at
ho
ge
ns
 (8
5%
 fo
r t
ho
se
 a
ge
d 
0–
4 
ye
ar
s 
on
e 
w
ee
k 
ah
ea
d 
of
 ro
ta
vi
ru
s)
 [2
0]
; 
an
 in
cr
ea
se
 in
 w
in
te
r o
f 2
00
2/
03
 p
os
si
bl
y 
re
la
te
d 
to
 n
or
ov
iru
s 
ac
tiv
ity
 [2
1]
Th
e 
ge
ne
ra
l n
eu
ro
lo
gi
ca
l s
yn
dr
om
e 
di
d 
no
t c
le
ar
ly
 re
fle
ct
 
kn
ow
n 
di
se
as
e 
dy
na
m
ic
.
A 
vi
ra
l n
eu
ro
lo
gi
ca
l s
yn
dr
om
e 
sh
ow
ed
 s
um
m
er
 p
ea
ks
 
co
nc
ur
re
nt
 w
ith
 e
nt
er
ov
iru
s 
pe
ak
s:
 6
2%
 o
f i
ts
 v
ar
ia
tio
ns
 w
as
 
ex
pl
ai
ne
d 
by
 e
nt
er
ov
iru
s 
no
tifi
ca
tio
ns
 [2
2]
 
La
bo
ra
to
ry
 
su
bm
is
si
on
s 
(n
eg
at
iv
e 
an
d 
po
si
tiv
e 
re
su
lts
)
W
in
te
r p
ea
ks
 c
on
cu
rre
nt
 w
ith
 p
ea
ks
 in
 in
flu
en
za
, R
SV
 a
nd
 
ot
he
r r
es
pi
ra
to
ry
 p
at
ho
ge
ns
: 6
1%
 o
f v
ar
ia
tio
ns
 e
xp
la
in
ed
 b
y 
re
sp
ira
to
ry
 p
at
ho
ge
ns
; 2
 w
ee
ks
 b
eh
in
d 
RS
V,
 0
–1
 w
ee
k 
ah
ea
d 
of
 in
flu
en
za
 [1
9]
Re
la
tiv
el
y 
lo
w
 w
in
te
r p
ea
ks
 a
nd
hi
gh
er
 s
um
m
er
 p
ea
ks
 c
on
cu
rre
nt
 w
ith
 ro
ta
vi
ru
s 
an
d 
Sh
ig
el
la
/S
al
m
on
el
la
/C
am
py
lo
ba
ct
er
 p
ea
ks
, r
es
pe
ct
iv
el
y
No
 c
le
ar
 re
fle
ct
io
n 
of
 k
no
w
n 
di
se
as
e 
dy
na
m
ic
s
M
or
ta
lit
y
W
in
te
r p
ea
ks
 c
on
cu
rre
nt
 w
ith
 p
ea
ks
 in
 in
flu
en
za
, R
SV
 a
nd
 
ot
he
r r
es
pi
ra
to
ry
 p
at
ho
ge
ns
; 7
8%
 o
f v
ar
ia
tio
ns
 e
xp
la
in
ed
 b
y 
re
sp
ira
to
ry
 p
at
ho
ge
ns
; 3
 w
ee
ks
 b
eh
in
d 
RS
V,
 0
–1
 w
ee
k 
ah
ea
d 
of
 in
flu
en
za
 [1
9]
No
 o
bv
io
us
 re
fle
ct
io
n 
of
 k
no
w
n 
se
as
on
al
 p
at
ho
ge
n 
ac
tiv
ity
: 
an
 in
cr
ea
se
 in
 w
in
te
r 2
00
2/
03
 p
os
si
bl
y 
re
la
te
d 
to
 
no
ro
vi
ru
s 
ac
tiv
ity
 [2
1]
 
No
 c
le
ar
 re
fle
ct
io
n 
of
 k
no
w
n 
di
se
as
e 
dy
na
m
ic
s
RS
V:
 re
sp
ira
to
ry
 s
yn
cy
tia
l v
iru
s.
Th
e 
ta
bl
e 
su
m
m
ar
is
es
 p
er
 d
at
a 
an
d 
sy
nd
ro
m
e 
ty
pe
 w
he
th
er
 s
yn
dr
om
e 
pe
ak
s 
co
nc
ur
re
d 
w
ith
 p
at
ho
ge
n 
pe
ak
s,
 w
ha
t p
er
ce
nt
ag
e 
of
 th
e 
sy
nd
ro
m
e 
va
ria
tio
ns
 is
 e
xp
la
in
ed
 b
y 
va
ria
tio
ns
 in
 p
at
ho
ge
n 
co
un
ts
, 
an
d 
w
ha
t t
he
 d
iff
er
en
ce
s 
in
 ti
m
el
in
es
s 
w
er
e 
be
tw
ee
n 
th
e 
sy
nd
ro
m
e 
an
d 
pa
th
og
en
 d
at
a.
 T
he
 la
tt
er
 a
re
 a
ss
es
se
d 
by
 th
e 
op
tim
is
ed
 la
gs
 o
f p
at
ho
ge
n 
co
un
ts
 in
 ti
m
e-
se
rie
s 
m
od
el
s 
th
at
 e
xp
la
in
 th
e 
sy
nd
ro
m
e 
va
ria
tio
n 
[1
9]
.
a  T
he
 a
bs
en
te
ei
sm
 d
at
a 
la
ck
ed
 m
ed
ic
al
 in
fo
rm
at
io
n,
 b
ut
 it
s 
tim
e 
se
rie
s 
re
fle
ct
ed
 re
sp
ira
to
ry
 p
at
ho
ge
n 
ac
tiv
it
y;
 th
er
ef
or
e 
th
e 
ot
he
r s
yn
dr
om
es
 w
er
e 
no
t e
va
lu
at
ed
 fo
r t
hi
s 
re
gi
st
ry
.
b  N
o 
da
ta
 o
n 
ph
ar
m
ac
y 
pr
es
cr
ip
tio
ns
 s
pe
ci
fic
 fo
r n
eu
ro
lo
gi
ca
l c
on
di
tio
ns
 w
er
e 
av
ai
la
bl
e 
fo
r a
na
ly
si
s.
4 www.eurosurveillance.org
potential syndromic data sources, we asked Dutch 
healthcare registry owners to provide information on 
predefined criteria (coverage, timeliness of data entry 
and potential for transition to real-time data availabil-
ity). Table 1 shows the registries included in the study, 
with data on work absenteeism, general practitioner 
(GP) consultations, pharmacy prescriptions, laboratory 
submissions, hospitalisations and mortality. Data were 
available for 1999–2009 or part of this period. 
On the basis of available literature cited in PubMed on 
bioterrorism and natural infectious disease threats, we 
selected syndromes that were expected to reflect the 
clinical presentations of both high-threat (i.e. capable 
of causing major outbreaks of severe illness) and com-
mon pathogens [16,17]. This not only makes it possible 
to use common pathogen activity as a test case for 
these syndromes, but also implies that emergence of 
the high-threat pathogens concerned will be relatively 
difficult to recognise by clinicians. We selected respi-
ratory syndromes (e.g. for high-threat pathogens such 
as Bacillus anthracis or a new pandemic influenza vari-
ant), gastroenteritis syndromes (e.g. caused by Vibrio 
cholerae infection) and neurological syndromes (e.g. 
caused by West Nile virus infection). The syndromes 
were defined for each registry, guided by a list of syn-
drome definitions defined by the United States Centers 
for Disease Control and Prevention [18] and experts in 
infectious diseases and medical microbiology at the 
Rijksinstituut voor Volksgezondheid en Milieu (National 
Institute for Public Health and the Environment, RIVM). 
The syndromes were then evaluated per registry for 
their potential use in signalling infectious disease 
dynamics and outbreaks. 
In this article, we present our perspective on the added 
value of syndromic surveillance for infectious disease 
surveillance and control, based on the results of our 
evaluation study and in light of the literature up to and 
including 2010. 
Main findings of syndromic surveillance 
evaluation 
Tracking infectious disease dynamics 
in the general population
The first question we addressed was to what extent 
trends in respiratory, gastroenteritis and neurologi-
cal syndromes in the various registries reflect known 
pathogen activity, as measured by counts of detected 
pathogens (available from routine laboratory surveil-
lance). This indicates whether these registries have the 
potential to reflect emerging pathogen activity (Table 
2). 
Of the three syndromes, respiratory syndromes were 
most closely associated with laboratory pathogen 
counts (Table 2), displaying higher levels in winter, 
which corresponded to higher counts of respiratory 
pathogens [19]. Up to 86% of the weekly syndrome var-
iations (i.e. variance) in time were explained by weekly 
variations in respiratory pathogen counts, particularly 
of influenza viruses and respiratory syncytial virus 
(RSV), which is in line with other studies [23,24]. 
However, the respiratory syndromes in our study were 
zero to five weeks ahead of laboratory counts of influ-
enza viruses, suggesting better timeliness of these 
syndromes. For RSV, the pathogen counts were concur-
rent with respiratory syndromes from hospitalisation 
registry data, which would be expected as most RSV 
tests are performed on hospitalised young children 
[25,26]. Most respiratory syndromes from other regis-
try data lagged behind the RSV counts, which suggests 
that young children are affected relatively early in the 
annual RSV season. 
The gastroenteritis syndromes showed winter peaks 
concurrent with increased rotavirus activity, and 
summer peaks concurrent with peaks in Shigella, 
Campylobacter and Salmonella activity (Table 2). 
Variation in the reporting of gastroenteritis syndromes 
explained by pathogen counts was lower (29–40%) than 
in the respiratory syndromes, although it increased up 
to 85% when limiting the analysis to young children, 
with the syndromes’ counts one to two weeks ahead of 
the laboratory rotavirus counts [20]. 
The reported general neurological syndromes did not 
clearly reflect known patterns of pathogen activity 
(Table 2). However, a more specific viral neurological 
syndrome – unexplained viral meningitis syndrome – 
in the hospitalisation registry data did: 62% of the var-
iation in the reporting of this syndrome was explained 
by known seasonal enterovirus activity, suggesting 
that elevated levels of unexplained viral meningitis 
indicate undiagnosed enterovirus infections [22]. 
The general practitioner consultations, pharmacy pre-
scriptions, hospitalisations and mortality registry data 
thus showed good performance in timely tracking of 
respiratory and/or gastrointestinal disease, and the 
hospital registry data also showed moderate perform-
ance for neurological disease (Table 2). The advantage 
of using these four complementary registries together 
would be that they cover mild to very severe morbid-
ity. The absenteeism registry data seemed most timely 
(ahead of laboratory surveillance data), but showed 
only moderate performance in tracking respiratory 
disease. This could be due to the fact that medical 
information is not available in this registry, and thus 
the data are a mix of all kinds of disease, although res-
piratory disease is clearly reflected in the time-series 
pattern. The laboratory submissions registry data 
showed, at most, a moderate performance for the three 
syndromes evaluated.
Monitoring disease burden and 
detecting virulence shifts
The second research question we addressed was 
whether syndromic surveillance improves the moni-
toring of disease burden and detects shifts in the 
virulence of common pathogens. We evaluated this by 
relating time series of syndromic surveillance data with 
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pathogen-specific surveillance data to quantify the dis-
ease burden due to common pathogens over time. We 
found a clear association over time of norovirus labo-
ratory surveillance data with mild-to-severe morbidity 
and even deaths in elderly people, observed in recent 
years, coinciding with emergence of new norovirus var-
iants [21]. The emergence of these variants had been 
suspected but could not be assessed by any other 
routine surveillance system. In addition, for influenza 
we detected previously unknown shifts in the annual 
numbers of hospitalisations and deaths related to the 
number of influenza-like illness (ILI) cases, coinciding 
with shifts in the antigenicity of circulating viruses 
[27]. Such analyses can also be used for investigating 
the severity of pandemic influenza A(H1N1)2009 infec-
tion compared with that of seasonal influenza [28]. 
Detecting local outbreaks
The third question we addressed was whether syndro-
mic surveillance can detect unexpected disease out-
breaks in a timely manner. For this purpose, analysis of 
aggregated nationwide data may not be very sensitive: 
the large volume of the data (e.g. tens of thousands of 
respiratory syndrome hospitalisations per year) makes 
it impossible to detect outbreaks when they are still 
small. Local detection of syndrome elevations using 
a space–time algorithm might signal emerging out-
breaks much sooner [29]. To test this, we used known 
outbreaks of Legionnaires’ disease as positive con-
trols of realistic severe respiratory disease outbreaks 
due to uncommon or new pathogens that may not be 
detected by traditional surveillance in a timely man-
ner. Simulating prospective surveillance, we were able 
to timely detect these known outbreaks in syndromic 
hospital data using space–time scan statistics [29]. 
The fact that the overall alarm rate was modest (a 
mean of five local clusters detected per year) suggests 
that syndromic surveillance of hospitalisation data for 
respiratory disease can indeed be a useful early-warn-
ing tool for local outbreak detection. Using the same 
approach, previously unknown disease clusters plau-
sibly due to Q fever were detected [30], thus illustrat-
ing that on some occasions syndromic surveillance can 
identify outbreaks that otherwise would remain unde-
tected. These analyses were motivated by the clinical 
detection of a large Q fever outbreak in 2007 and the 
subsequent years, which raised the question whether 
smaller outbreaks might have preceded the 2007 out-
break. Real-time detection and investigation of these 
previously unknown clusters could possibly have led to 
earlier awareness of increased Q fever activity. 
Assessing the absence or limited 
size of unusual disease events
In public health practice, besides timely detection of 
unusual outbreaks, being able to assess and commu-
nicate the absence or limited size of unusual disease 
events can also be important. For example, Blendon et 
al. suggested that better communication to the pub-
lic during the 2003 SARS outbreak might have pre-
vented economic loss due to unnecessary precautions 
taken by the public (e.g. many people stayed away 
from crowded places, even in areas with a relatively 
low level of spread of the virus) [31]. Also during high-
profile public events (e.g. the Olympics or G8 summits) 
[32,33], syndromic surveillance will mainly confirm the 
absence of major, unusual disease outbreaks, since 
such outbreaks are rare events.
We also examined the value of syndromic data in 
assessing the absence or limited size of unusual dis-
ease triggered by specific public health concerns. For 
West Nile virus (WNV) infection, enhanced surveil-
lance was established in the Netherlands by labora-
tory testing of cerebrospinal fluid (CSF) from patients 
with unexplained viral meningitis/encephalitis [22]. 
None of the CSFs collected in 2002 to 2004 tested 
positive for WNV, but the probability that WNV was 
indeed absent in the country could only be assessed 
from the annual count of unexplained viral meningitis/
encephalitis cases (as a denominator in relation to the 
number of CSF samples tested). For hepatitis E and 
Ljungan virus infections, we inspected time series of 
unexplained hepatitis and abortion/perinatal death, 
respectively, and found no signs of emerging activity 
of these viruses. Rumours about a continuing increase 
of impetigo in children were countered by inspection of 
a time series of GP consultations for the infection. 
Other spin-offs of syndromic surveillance
In addition to the above described applications, other 
uses of syndromic surveillance were illustrated dur-
ing the 2009 influenza A(H1N1) pandemic. We used 
respiratory syndromic data on hospitalisations and 
GP consultations to plan the diagnostic capacity that 
would be needed if a larger proportion of the persons 
with respiratory symptoms would be tested – as is the 
case in the early stages of a pandemic [34]. Also early 
in the pandemic, the reaction of the public to media 
reports on pandemic influenza was illustrated by sharp 
elevations in the number of oseltamivir prescriptions 
[35]. This information was used to urge physicians to 
exercise restraint in prescribing oseltamivir, in order 
to decrease the risk of oseltamivir shortage and viral 
resistance later in the pandemic.
Data requirements
The results of our project suggest specific data require-
ments for successful syndromic surveillance. Data 
quality is important for all applications of syndromic 
surveillance, but probably mostly for local outbreak 
detection. Here, relatively small artefacts – for exam-
ple, duplicate details of the same patient in one reg-
istry – can result in false alarms, as we experienced 
when using hospital data for space–time cluster detec-
tion [29,30]. In a real-time setting (e.g. daily or weekly 
data updates), reporting delays can also lead to data 
artefacts and false alarms, if, for example, there is a 
delay in hospitals submitting their data [36]. In addi-
tion to having few data artefacts, data need to be 
representative, and for local outbreak detection, they 
also need to have a high coverage (preferably close 
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to 100%) to be able to timely detect local outbreaks in 
any region. By using data with relatively low coverage 
levels, sensitivity for local outbreaks obviously will be 
reduced [37,38]. Nordin et al. used simulated anthrax 
attack data, and integrated the simulated data into 
actual physicians’ visit data to show that the sensitivity 
for detecting respiratory outbreaks resulting from bio-
terrorism was not very high [37]. However, the authors 
evaluated a maximum system coverage of only 36% of 
the population. In another study, Balter et al. reported 
that a syndromic surveillance system in New York City 
sometimes missed several gastroenteritis outbreaks 
due to data quality (e.g. miscoding of patients’ chief 
complaints) and coverage problems (e.g. some hospi-
tals did not participate in the system) [38]. 
For effective signal verification, sufficient information 
on individual patients’ characteristics and concurrent 
laboratory trends has to be available to identify possi-
ble causes of generated signals. For example, we inter-
preted local respiratory syndrome clusters in relation 
to local influenza or RSV activity: if the age distribution 
of cases reflected the usual pattern for these viruses, 
we regarded further investigation unnecessary [29]. 
Also, the rise in oseltamivir prescriptions early in the 
2009 influenza A(H1N1) pandemic could be ascribed 
to the ‘worried well’, because laboratory surveillance 
showed that influenza virus activity had not increased 
[35]. Without such verification options, the value of 
syndromic surveillance is limited [38]. 
Cost-effectiveness of real-time 
surveillance systems
An important question is whether syndromic surveil-
lance is cost effective. Events such as a bioterrorist 
attack, a SARS epidemic or an influenza pandemic are 
rare and the question arises how much of the public 
health budget should be spent on a detection system 
for such rare events. 
The costs of a surveillance system can be easily esti-
mated. Studies that report the operating costs asso-
ciated with real-time syndromic surveillance found 
annual operating costs ranging from US$ 130,000–
150,000 to US$ 280,000 [39]. However, estimating 
its benefits is less obvious. Kaufmann et al. reported 
that the economic damage caused by a bioterrorist 
attack can amount to millions or even billions of dol-
lars [40]. The SARS epidemic in 2003 and the influenza 
pandemic in 2009 showed that the economic damage 
caused by naturally occurring outbreaks can be simi-
larly high [41,42]. If similar disease events emerge 
every few years, and syndromic surveillance leads to 
earlier detection and control of such outbreaks, then 
the benefits of syndromic surveillance are likely to 
outweigh its costs. The question here is whether ear-
lier detection would indeed lead to control or at least 
reduced impact of a new disease, for instance, SARS 
or influenza A(H1N1)2009 infection. Simulation stud-
ies could help to further evaluate which specific types 
of major disease events syndromic surveillance could 
probably lead to interventions that limit the economic 
damage. 
Possibly just as important as the benefits arising from 
earlier detection and control is the downscaling of 
unnecessary interventions during ongoing outbreaks. 
This requires quick assessment of the limited size and 
severity of outbreaks. For example, if the severity of a 
new pandemic can be quickly assessed – as the World 
Health Organization (WHO) requires [43] – by reliable 
syndromic hospital surveillance of severe respiratory 
infections, costly interventions such as quarantine and 
prophylactic treatment or vaccination could be downs-
caled or stopped earlier if the disease is only mild.
In the Netherlands, prospective surveillance has now 
started for crude mortality data, with weekly data col-
lection and analysis since the 2009 influenza pandemic. 
The existing mortality registry allows prospective 
implementation at relatively low extra cost. Real-time 
data collection is currently also being implemented for 
the Dutch GP registry (Table 1). Including hospital data 
and other data types in future syndromic surveillance 
systems may also be feasible at limited cost, if the 
data collection can be integrated into already planned 
real-time, future data infrastructures such as the Dutch 
national health-information-exchange system [44].
Recommendations
On the basis of our evaluation, we recommend the use 
of syndromic surveillance to reveal blind spots of tradi-
tional surveillance, in particular by detecting unusual, 
local outbreaks independently of laboratory diagnoses 
of specific pathogens, and by monitoring disease bur-
den and virulence shifts of common pathogens. 
Our results are mostly based on retrospective analysis 
of syndromic data of high quality and coverage. If pro-
spective collection of such syndromic data is not feasi-
ble, real-time early warning for local outbreaks should 
not be performed, since true outbreaks will probably 
be missed while at the same time numerous false 
alarms will be generated. For real-time early warning, 
sufficient laboratory and epidemiological information 
is needed, in order to be able to quickly verify possible 
causes of syndromic signals, and thus recognise rele-
vant signals that might need a response. Retrospective 
analyses as performed in our evaluation can validate 
the relevant data and analyses before prospective 
implementation of a syndromic surveillance system.
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